Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection

Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/11147/7148

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  • Article
    Toward Reliable Annotation in Low-Resource NLP: A Mixture of Agents Framework and Multi-LLM Benchmarking
    (IEEE-Inst Electrical Electronics Engineers Inc, 2025) Onan, Aytug; Nasution, Arbi Haza; Celikten, Tugba
    This paper introduces the Mixture-of-Agents (MoA) framework, a structured approach for improving the reliability of large language model (LLM)-based text annotation in low-resource NLP contexts. MoA employs coordinated agent interactions to enhance agreement, interpretability, and robustness without manual supervision. Evaluations on Turkish classification benchmarks demonstrate that MoA achieves up to 10-point improvements in macro-F1 over single-model baselines and significantly increases inter-agent consistency. Additionally, three novel reliability metrics-Conflict Rate (CR), Ambiguity Resolution Success Rate (ARSR), and Refinement Correction Rate (RCR)-are proposed to quantify annotation stability and correction dynamics. The results indicate that multi-agent coordination can substantially improve label quality, offering a scalable pathway toward trustworthy annotation in low-resource and cross-domain applications. The framework is language-agnostic and adaptable to other low-resource contexts beyond Turkish, including morphologically rich or typologically diverse languages such as Indonesian, Urdu, and Swahili. These findings highlight the scalability of MoA as a generalizable solution for multilingual and cross-domain annotation.
  • Article
    Citation - WoS: 1
    Citation - Scopus: 2
    New Security Proofs and Complexity Records for Advanced Encryption Standard
    (IEEE-Inst Electrical Electronics Engineers Inc, 2023) Kara, Orhun
    Common block ciphers like AES specified by the NIST or KASUMI (A5/3) of GSM are extensively utilized by billions of individuals globally to protect their privacy and maintain confidentiality in daily communications. However, these ciphers lack comprehensive security proofs against the vast majority of known attacks. Currently, security proofs are limited to differential and linear attacks for both AES and KASUMI. For instance, the consensus on the security of AES is not based on formal mathematical proofs but on intensive cryptanalysis over its reduced rounds spanning several decades. In this work, we introduce new security proofs for AES against another attack method: impossible differential (ID) attacks. We classify ID attacks as reciprocal and nonreciprocal ID attacks. We show that sharp and generic lower bounds can be imposed on the data complexities of reciprocal ID attacks on substitution permutation networks. We prove that the minimum data required for a reciprocal ID attack on AES using a conventional ID characteristic is 2(66) chosen plaintexts whereas a nonreciprocal ID attack involves at least 2(88) computational steps. We mount a nonreciprocal ID attack on 6-round AES for 192-bit and 2(56)-bit keys, which requires only 2(18) chosen plaintexts and outperforms the data complexity of any attack. Given its marginal time complexity, this attack does not pose a substantial threat to the security of AES. However, we have made enhancements to the integral attack on 6-round AES, thereby surpassing the longstanding record for the most efficient attack after a period of 23 years.