WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection

Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/11147/7150

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Access Right: Closed AccessAuthor: search.filters.author.Kara, Orhun

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  • Conference Object
    Citation - WoS: 1
    Citation - Scopus: 1
    Robust and Energy-Efficient Hardware Architectures for Dizy Stream Cipher
    (IEEE, 2024) Schmid, Martin; Arul, Tolga; Kavun, Elif Bilge; Regazzoni, Francesco; Kara, Orhun
    In the era of ubiquitous computing, efficient and secure implementations of cryptographic hardware are crucial. This paper extends the hardware implementations of a Small Internal State Stream (SISS) cipher, namely DIZY. Previous work shows that DIZY's hardware performance, in terms of area cost and power consumption, is among the best when compared to notable stream ciphers, especially for frame-based encryptions requiring frequent initialization. In this study, we initially optimize the existing hardware implementation and then evaluate the energy efficiency of DIZY. We implement different unrolled versions of DIZY and analyze their energy consumption. Furthermore, we address physical security by integrating masking techniques into the DIZY S-box to protect the implementation against side-channel attacks. We thoroughly investigate the associated overhead and apply optimizations to reduce it, ensuring robust security without compromising efficiency. Our results present a secure, energy-efficient, and lightweight cryptographic hardware design for the stream cipher DIZY, making it suitable for various applications, including Internet of Things (IoT) and embedded systems.
  • Article
    Citation - WoS: 2
    Square Impossible Differential Attack and Security of Aes in Known Plaintext Scenario
    (Taylor & Francis inc, 2024) Kara, Orhun
    In this work, we examine the security of the 8-round AES, under the known plaintext attack scenario, a type of cryptographic attack in which an attacker has access to the plaintext and corresponding ciphertext pairs. We present an innovative impossible differential (ID) attack technique, which utilizes a specific ID characteristic, to perform the first known plaintext attack on the 8-round AES with a 256-bit key. Additionally, we propose a new attack methodology, known as the Square Impossible Differential (SID) attack, to enhance the effectiveness of the ID attacks on AES in chosen ciphertext or plaintext scenarios. The SID attack is a combination of a square attack and an ID attack. Our methodology introduces various new approaches, including the key indicator vectors, eliminating the key candidate through the Meet-in-The-Middle technique and mounting the guess and determine attack through the hash tables for the two-round decryption of one column of AES while determining the subkeys constituting the impossible differential characteristic for a given plaintext/ciphertext difference pair. Our approach demonstrates lower computational complexity compared to previous methods, and our analysis shows that the complexities of our known plaintext attack and SID attack are estimated to be 2220 and 2209, respectively.