Mathematics / Matematik
Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/11147/8
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Article Citation - Scopus: 9Sufficient Condition for Ephemeral Key-Leakage Resilient Tripartite Key Exchange(Springer Verlag, 2012) Fujioka, Atsushi; Manulis, Mark; Suzuki, Koutarou; Ustaoğlu, BerkantTripartite (Diffie-Hellman) Key Exchange (3KE), introduced by Joux (ANTS-IV 2000), represents today the only known class of group key exchange protocols, in which computation of unauthenticated session keys requires one round and proceeds with minimal computation and communication overhead. The first one-round authenticated 3KE version that preserved the unique efficiency properties of the original protocol and strengthened its security towards resilience against leakage of ephemeral (session-dependent) secrets was proposed recently by Manulis, Suzuki, and Ustaoglu (ICISC 2009). In this work we explore sufficient conditions for building such protocols. We define a set of admissible polynomials and show how their construction generically implies 3KE protocols with the desired security and efficiency properties. Our result generalizes the previous 3KE protocol and gives rise to many new authenticated constructions, all of which enjoy forward secrecy and resilience to ephemeral key-leakage under the gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.Conference Object Citation - WoS: 9Citation - Scopus: 24Modeling Leakage of Ephemeral Secrets in Tripartite/Group Key Exchange(Springer Verlag, 2010) Manulis, Mark; Suzuki, Koutarou; Ustaoğlu, BerkantRecent advances in the design and analysis of secure two-party key exchange (2KE) such as the leakage of ephemeral secrets used during the attacked sessions remained unnoticed by the current models for group key exchange (GKE). Focusing on a special case of GKE - the tripartite key exchange (3KE) - that allows for efficient one-round protocols, we demonstrate how to incorporate these advances to the multi-party setting. From this perspective our work closes the most pronounced gap between provably secure 2KE and GKE protocols. The proposed 3KE protocol is an implicitly authenticated protocol with one communication round which remains secure even in the event of ephemeral secret leakage. It also significantly improves upon currently known 3KE protocols, many of which are insecure. An optional key confirmation round can be added to our proposal to achieve the explicitly authenticated protocol variant. © 2010 Springer-Verlag.